restraint of trade. Although these three words have diff erent meanings in other contexts, in antitrust law they mean the same thing: an agreement. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the agreement element of Section 1 is designed to limit the category restraints of trade to those that are more likely to be harmful:
Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision-making that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefi t. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well lead to effi ciencies that benefi t consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is suffi cient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly. 13 The framers of the Act evidently believed that, in cases other than monopolization, fi rms could ordinarily reduce competition only by engaging in some sort of agreement. The prototypical agreement in restraint of trade is the cartel. The early cases that condemned cartels under Section 1 involved express, usually written agreements that the statutory language obviously encompassed.
14 No one contested the applicability of the agreement requirement to these arrangements; any problems of interpretation in these cases lay in other areas, such as whether Section 1 prohibited all restraints of trade or only unreasonable ones. 15 The interpretive conundrum concerning the meaning of agreement arises when informal patterns of conduct in oligopoly mimic the eff ects of an express cartel. 16 At least since the 1930s, economists have shown that fi rms in an oligopoly can, in certain conditions, achieve noncompetitive prices and outputs without a formal agreement by making choices that anticipate each others' likely responses 17 -what courts have called oligopolistic interdependence, 18 conscious parallelism, 19 or tacit collusion.
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In game theory, behavior like this can allow fi rms to achieve noncompetitive prices. 21 The pristine case often hypothesized involves rival gas stations at the same street corner in a remote town: by publicly posting a price increase, one station might invite similar actions by rivals, who may comply 22 if they see that they will all profi t if they all follow the fi rst fi rm's price and stick to it, rather than keep prices down in order to increase output temporarily. 23 It was not always clear whether this sort of conduct violates Section 1. The language of the statute is not decisive, because one might characterize the initial price increase as an 'off er' that the rivals then 'accept' by following suit.
24 Donald Turner argued decades ago, however, that conscious parallelism, without more, cannot be an agreement, or at least an illegal agreement under Section 1, because the rivals are only acting rationally based on available information, like competitive fi rms. 25 Moreover, Turner argued, it would be vain to try to prevent this sort of conduct, because the remedy would require fi rms to act irrationally or to submit to direct price regulation.
26 Richard Posner famously responded (and still responds) that, because tacit collusion requires conscious choices, it should be viewed as 'a form of concerted action' 27 that the law could remedy without 'telling oligopolists to behave irrationally'. 28 To make a very long story short, courts have sided with Turner in this dispute. 29 The Supreme Court has recently observed that parallel conduct is 'consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market'. 30 Thus, modern courts would certainly hold that the fi rms in the gas station scenario have not done anything culpable or at least not anything the courts could sensibly penalize or enjoin without doing more harm than good.
The presence of facilitating practices complicates the Section 1 treatment of parallel conduct. The simple gas station scenario rarely occurs in real-world markets, because fi rms are typically not able to coordinate their actions simply by publicly posting prices. 31 Successful coordination, as I have already noted, requires detection and punishment of deviators. In many markets, fi rms' list prices may be diffi cult for their rivals to discover from public information. The list prices may also diff er from transaction prices, because fi rms off er selective, secret discounts. Heterogeneous products and power buyers can multiply the problems of coordination.
32
In these circumstances, cheating might quickly undermine the tacitly arranged price. Thus, fi rms may adopt a facilitating practice to keep tabs on each other's prices.
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As I will show in Part III below, if fi rms expressly agree to adopt one of these facilitating practices, for example as a trade association rule, and the eff ect of the practice is to reduce competition, then that agreement may be independently illegal under Section 1. Moreover, the Sherman Act may preempt a state law that requires rivals to use a facilitating practice. A more diffi cult question arises, however, where the fi rms each adopt the same facilitating practice without any express agreement: does parallel pricing together with parallel adoption of facilitating practices allow a court to infer the requisite agreement? Both Turner and Posner believed that, unlike simple parallel pricing, the parallel adoption of a facilitating practice that permits noncompetitive pricing should be unlawful, because the problem of remedy is mitigated. 34 Where the market is behaving noncompetitively and facilitating practices make that possible, so the argument goes, courts may characterize the circumstances as a Section 1 agreement and enjoin the use of the practices.
But conduct is not evidence of an agreement simply because it can be enjoined; it must also have no benign, independent justifi cation. Facilitating practices may do more than simply facilitate rivals' eff orts to achieve an ineffi cient oligopoly price. They also may provide certain immediate benefi ts to consumers by, among other things, reducing search or transaction costs (for example, by disseminating price information to consumers). In these circumstances, the fi rms' adoption of the practice might well be for the benign rather than the malign, collusive reason. The lesson of the public enforcement campaign against facilitating practices is that courts will not easily infer an agreement from the parallel adoption of facilitating practices where the practices have benefi cial functions apart from facilitating price coordination. Courts evaluate facilitating practices as one type of circumstantial evidence that may but usually does not warrant an inference of a Section 1 agreement.
Unfortunately, the stated legal standards of agreement under which courts evaluate circumstantial evidence, including facilitating practices, are inadequate. In the next Part, I review the defi ciencies of the present law governing the defi nition and proof of agreement under Section 1 and propose that the law should recognize that communication among rivals is necessary for concerted action. In Part III, I examine cases involving facilitating practices in a variety of Section 1 contexts, and suggest that the courts have come to recognize the importance of communications among rivals in evaluating whether the evidence warrants an inference of agreement.
II. The defi nition and proof of agreement
Courts have traditionally evaluated price-fi xing claims under two legal standards: a defi nition of agreement, and a standard of suffi ciency of the evidence to raise a jury question. The fi rst of these standards, which jurors are expected to apply if the issue of agreement reaches them, is defi cient, because the terms used to defi ne agreement are too ambiguous to make the essential distinctions. The Supreme Court has said that a Sherman Act agreement need not be 'explicit ', 35 'express', 36 or 'formal', 37 so long as the fi rms have 'a unity of purpose, a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds' 38 or 'a conscious commitment to a common scheme'. 39 The Court repeated the 'meeting of the minds' shibboleth in its recent Twombly decision. 40 Interpreted charitably, these phrases seem to suggest that rivals agree if they act in the same way, thinking they share a common goal. But those conditions are met by consciously parallel pricing, which we now know is lawful. 41 Thus, the law's defi nition of agreement off ers no basis for making the most diffi cult distinction courts and juries must make under Section 1.
Nor has antitrust law borrowed a useful defi nition of agreement from ordinary usage, the law of contracts, or economics. The courts recognize that agreement under the Sherman Act is a 'term of art' whose meaning diff ers from its usage in 'ordinary parlance'. 42 An agreement under the Sherman Act also cannot be the same as an enforceable agreement in the law of contracts, because Sherman Act agreements, if they restrain trade, are necessarily illegal and unenforceable. 43 Finally, agreement has no technical meaning in economics. Economists distinguish between competitive and noncompetitive outcomes, but they do not formally distinguish between noncompetitive outcomes achieved by consciously parallel action and those achieved by an informal agreement. 44 Thus, economists are typically not permitted to testify whether circumstantial evidence raises an inference of an agreement, because that issue lies outside of their expertise. 45 Consequently, if a case alleging horizontal agreement goes to trial, the jurors that decide the case will not be permitted to apply their common understanding of agreement, yet they will not be given a meaningful defi nition of agreement by the court or by the expert witnesses.
Most cases based on circumstantial evidence do not go to trial, however, because of the second standard, which defi nes the suffi ciency of evidence to raise a jury question. Under Matsushita, 'to survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently'. 46 Alternatively, courts require evidence that 'tend[s] to exclude the possibility that the defendants merely were engaged in lawful conscious parallelism'. 47 Another way courts express this standard is by requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence amounting to a 'plus factor'. 48 Although this latter term has a long history and has been used in a variety of ways, 49 courts now use it almost exclusively as a label to characterize evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action, and thus creates a jury issue of agreement. 50 Several pieces of evidence viewed as whole may raise the necessary inference. 51 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Twombly 52 on pleading standards for conspiracy cases is a logical outgrowth of this rule: it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege parallel conduct; it must also allege some plausible ground for thinking the parallel conduct is the result of a conspiracy.
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This criterion is signifi cant, because it prohibits an inference of agreement in cases in which each defendant's actions are in its individual selfinterest, regardless of whether the other defendants act in the same way. In such circumstances, the evidence is fully consistent with independent action; it is certainly not consistent only with collusion. For example, in the classic Theatre Enterprises case, the defendant fi lm distributors refused to license fi rst-run fi lms to a suburban theater. 54 Although the actions were parallel and uniform, each fi rm had an independent justifi cation for the action, because downtown theaters off ered more profi table venues.
Although consciously parallel conduct does not raise an inference that the fi rms in the market have agreed, it remains unclear what sort of evidence does. Courts often suggest that evidence of actions contrary to the defendants' individual self-interest can amount to a plus factor. 55 But this observation must be qualifi ed: it does not mean that parallel conduct is evidence of agreement if the conduct is profi table only if all fi rms act in the same way. In such a case, each fi rm may be acting against its shortrun self-interest, because it could profi t immediately by breaking with the group and increasing sales. But the fi rms may be acting in their long-run self-interest by, for example, maintaining the higher price by conscious parallelism. Because courts have recognized that simple conscious parallelism is lawful, 'individual self-interest' must also include the interest in gaining the benefi ts of consciously parallel action. 56 It is, in other words, legitimately in the self-interest of a fi rm to anticipate the actions of one's rivals and to act accordingly, even if it means sacrifi cing short-run profi ts in hopes of long-term noncompetitive pricing. Thus, if a customer were to sue our hypothetical rural gas stations who coordinated a price increase by interdependent actions, the customer would suff er summary judgment. Even if the fi rst station might have lost $100 in profi t to the others had they chosen to abjure the price increase and to sell more gasoline (at the fi rst station's expense) at a lower price, the stations do not act against their selfinterest by matching the price increase and selling less, if they split $200 in profi t by doing so. 57 Consequently, the plaintiff must produce something more than evidence that the defendants have acted against their short-run self-interest.
The uncertainty about what sort of evidence amounts to a plus factor is attributable mainly to the vacuity of the Supreme Court's defi nitions of agreement and the absence of a coherent economic defi nition that might fi ll the void. If we knew better what a Section 1 agreement was, we could be more certain about what sort of evidence makes it reasonable to infer the agreement, and what role facilitating practices might play in that inference. We would also be more certain what sorts of allegations raise a plausible inference of conspiracy under Twombly's pleading standard.
I have argued elsewhere, 58 building on the work of Oliver Black, 59 that US law should frankly acknowledge that communication is an element of agreement. According to Black, parties' parallel actions can be arranged along a spectrum of degrees of 'correlation'. 60 In the most highly correlated conduct that US law would call conscious parallelism, the fi rms act in reliance of their belief that their rivals will act in a certain way; the fi rms have the same goal; and all have knowledge that these conditions have been met. The fi rms' actions become concerted if the conditions of conscious parallelism are met in part because the fi rms have communicated their reliance and goals to each other. 61 Notice that, in this formulation, concerted action does not require the sort of exchange of promises or assurances that would be necessary for a completed verbal agreement, because the parallel action itself supplies an element of the off ense.
Although Black formulates this conception of agreement using the tools of analytical philosophy, his account bears a close resemblance to economists' stated beliefs, if not their formal theories, about the role of communication in cartels. As we have seen, economic theory does not recognize informal agreement as a category distinct from conscious parallelism. It also has not conclusively shown the role of communication of various sorts, especially 'cheap' or nonbinding talk, in achieving noncompetitive outcomes. 62 Nevertheless, many economists, including those with extensive experience in antitrust litigation, believe that communication is necessary to coordinate pricing in complex markets, even if it may not be in desert-island hypotheticals like our gas station example. 63 Studies of the functioning of real-world cartels invariably show extensive communications to coordinate 'price, volume allocation, production quotas, and, in the case of bid-rigging, who wins any given bid and what that winning bid will be'. 64 Not all communications among rivals are suspicious. Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfi eld suggest that communications are most likely to be anticompetitive if they are private rather than public, if they relate to current and future prices rather than historical prices, and if they are repeated rather than isolated. 65 Although these authors do not propose these categories of communications as a defi nition of agreement, the categories are consistent with Black's defi nition, which requires that the communications convey the fi rms' intended actions and their mutual reliance. More important, as I have argued elsewhere, US courts, although still citing the decades-old meaningless defi nitions, have implicitly adopted a defi nition of concerted action that requires communication of intent and reliance. 66 This understanding of the nature of concerted action has important implications for the evaluation of facilitating practices.
III. Facilitating practices
Facilitating practices raise issues under Section 1 in two primary contexts: where rivals adopt the practices by express agreement (or, analogously, pursuant to a state mandate), and where they adopt the practices by parallel action. Both contexts require analysis of the eff ects of the practice on the rivals' ability to coordinate prices. In the fi rst context, however, the fact that rivals have found it necessary to agree to adopt the practice (or the state has found it necessary to compel it) simplifi es the analysis, not only satisfying the agreement element, but by eliminating many of the possible independent and benefi cial explanations for the practices. As we see in the next section, the legality of practices in this fi rst category may hinge on whether the facilitating practice consists of an agreement to adhere to particular terms of dealing or an agreement to share information. Both types of agreement may facilitate price coordination, but courts view the agreements on terms of dealing with greater suspicion.
The more diffi cult cases are those in the second category: parallel adoption of the facilitating practices, which I address in the fi nal section of this Part. These cases raise the issue of whether the practice permits inference of an agreement. Some have argued that the presence of facilitating practices makes oligopoly pricing illegal. As I noted in the introduction, both Posner and Turner agreed that the existence of facilitating practices would justify a fi nding of Section 1 liability for consciously parallel action, because that would avoid the problem of remedy: enjoining the practice would eliminate the noncompetitive pricing. But the presence of facilitating practices does not avoid the antecedent problem of inferring an agreement. Applying the Matsushita standard, courts have recognized that '"facilitating devices" are not necessarily suffi cient under the law to constitute a "plus factor"'. 67 The same principles that prevent courts from inferring an agreement based on parallel pricing, also often prevent them from inferring an agreement from parallel pricing accompanied by facilitating practices. I suggest below that cases involving facilitating practices are best understood if they are evaluated under a defi nition of agreement that requires communication of reliance and intent. Since facilitating practices may themselves involve communications, they can meet the clarifi ed defi nition, particularly if other evidence supports the necessary inferences concerning the nature and content of the communications.
A. Agreements on (or state mandates of) terms of dealing that increase
pricing transparency Agreements that facilitate price coordination by fi xing rivals' terms of dealing are likely to be held illegal per se. 68 In Catalano, 69 for example, the Court condemned an agreement among beer distributors not to off er short-term credit. The agreement eliminated a common type of discount equal to the time value of the money owed. Although the agreement made transaction prices more transparent, it did so by limiting the rivals' 'action with respect to the published prices'. 70 Indeed, the arrangement was a facilitating practice primarily because it inhibited fi rms from engaging in secret discounting, which might have undermined any understanding on prices. The express agreement in Catalano was crucial to the result. Had the evidence shown only that the defendants individually declined to off er short-term credit, there would have been no inference of an agreement under Matsushita, because each fi rm could off er independent reasons for its actions. The fact that the fi rms found it necessary to agree on the practice, however, shows that any independent reasons for adopting it were not the decisive ones.
Earlier cases reached similar results. In Sugar Institute, 71 the Court held unlawful an agreement among rivals to adhere to publicly announced prices. Again, the agreement to abide by particular terms of dealing was the decisive factor. An industry-wide practice of announcing list prices and adhering to them would have been no more than conscious parallelism. An agreement to announce list prices, without the agreement to adhere to them, would place the practice in the more benign category of data dissemination. But an agreement by each fi rm to adhere to list prices, like the agreement in Catalano, amounted to an agreement to eliminate secret discounting. 72 Similar reasoning would apply to agreements to adopt other practices, like resale price maintenance or basing-point or delivered pricing, 73 that enhance price transparency by restricting terms of dealing. 74 An analogous line of decisions extends the reasoning of these cases to invalidate state-mandated facilitating practices. 75 Federal antitrust law preempts state economic legislation that mandates or authorizes private conduct that violates the antitrust laws, unless the regulatory scheme meets the requirements of state-action immunity, particularly 'clear articulation' of the policy and 'active supervision' by state regulators. 76 The Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that authorized private fi rms to restrain trade in ways that closely resemble antitrust violations, even where the restraints did not technically involve a private agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court has struck down state laws that authorized a manufacturer or wholesaler to dictate the prices at which its products could be resold by downstream fi rms. 77 The Court reasoned that the restraints amounted to state-mandated resale price maintenance, even though the state law did not require a vertical agreement, only compliance with terms laid down by the upstream fi rm. One of the grounds the Court off ered for these results was that this sort of resale price maintenance is a facilitating practice:
We have noted that industrywide resale price maintenance also may facilitate cartelization. Mandatory industrywide resale price fi xing is virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail price competition. The New York statute specifi cally forbids retailers to reduce the minimum prices set by wholesalers. On similar grounds, lower courts have condemned 'post and hold' statutes, which require liquor distributors to announce price lists and to charge only those prices for as long as the list is in eff ect. 79 The Fourth Circuit characterized the statute as 'a hybrid restraint that amounts to a per se violation of § 1'. 80 The arrangement diff ers from a purely private cartel, because nothing in the statute requires distributors to agree with each other. Nevertheless, the statute mandates a facilitating practice, and thus is closely analogous to cases, like Sugar Institute, in which fi rms agree to adopt a facilitating practice that limits their ability to discount. In eff ect, the statutory mandate serves the function of the trade association rule. The restraint is hybrid, and, because there is no active supervision of the private actors, it does not qualify for state action immunity.
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B. Agreements to exchange information
Horizontal agreements to exchange information, like those at issue in the trade association cases of the 1920s 82 and in Container, 83 are also facilitating practices, because they make it easier for rivals to coordinate prices. Unlike the restraints in Catalano and Sugar Institute, however, the terms of an information-exchange agreement do not control how the information will aff ect the rivals' terms of dealing. In some instances, they can benefi t consumers by spreading information in the market. 84 Thus, courts must weigh the likely anticompetitive and procompetitive eff ects. 85 The legality of these sorts of agreements thus depends on the nature of the information exchanged and the likely (and actual) eff ects of the practice, given the characteristics of the market. The cases suggest that exchanges of information are more likely to be unlawful if they include present and future prices, relate to specifi c transactions, and rely upon a central authority which interprets the data and makes recommendations. 86 These criteria closely resemble those proposed by Carlton, et al. 87 , for identifi cation of anticompetitive communications.
An information exchange may be unlawful if it is found to have an unreasonable eff ect on prices, or if it is found to be a plus factor permitting an inference of a per se illegal agreement to fi x prices.
88 Interestingly, the inquiries for these issues are similar. The existence of an agreement in cases alleging price fi xing is the dividing line between lawful and unlawful behavior, and thus involves policy choices about the legitimacy of various types of interactions among rivals. Thus, inference of a per se illegal agreement to fi x prices requires a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive eff ects that resembles a rule of reason analysis of the express agreement to exchange information.
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States
competition rather than to fi x prices. The retailers' association had gathered and evaluated complaints from members about wholesalers that sold directly to the retailers' customers. The association distributed a 'blacklist' of the direct-selling wholesalers to its members, who then generally refused to deal with those on the list. The Supreme Court held that the evident purpose and 'natural consequence' of the 'concerted action' of circulating the list was to induce the refusals to deal. 90 The arrangement 'tend[ed] to prevent other retailers who [had] no personal grievance against' the wholesaler from trading with it 'solely because of the infl uence of the report circulated among the members of the associations'. 91 The Court might have condemned the agreement to distribute the list because of its eff ects, but instead relied on the same evidence to infer the existence of a per se illegal boycott. The agreement's tendency to induce refusals to deal by retailers unaff ected by direct selling suggested that those refusals had no independent justifi cation, and thus justifi ed an inference of an agreement.
The key element in this inference was communication through the mechanism of data collection and dissemination. Retailers refused to deal because of the blacklist, which was assembled from their rivals' reports and presumably in reliance on their rivals doing the same. The case is thus distinguishable from Cement Manufacturers, in which an association circulated a list of fi rms engaged in fraud, 92 because that was information a retailer would fi nd suffi cient as a reason to refuse to deal regardless of the actions of its rivals.
C. Parallel adoption of facilitating practices
Finally, we are in a position to consider the legality of parallel pricing accompanied by parallel use of facilitating practices. It now seems clear that rivals' parallel use of a facilitating practice does not, by itself, raise an inference of agreement. One court stated, for example, that '"facilitating devices" are not necessarily suffi cient under the law to constitute a "plus factor"'. 93 There is often an independent justifi cation for a fi rm to adopt a practice that might facilitate price coordination. For example, in Ethyl, the court refused to condemn industry-wide use of advance notifi cation of price changes, price protection clauses, and delivered pricing, even though they facilitated price uniformity, because the practices had been adopted when there was only a single seller in the market and thus evidently served non-collusive purposes that consumers wanted. 94 Thus, under the Matsushita standard, the parallel adoption of a facilitating practice typically cannot exclude the possibility that the rivals were acting independently.
The Supreme Court's recent Leegin decision, 95 which abandoned the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, provides another useful illustration of the issues. That case held that resale price maintenance was not invariably anticompetitive, and so should be judged under the rule of reason. Manufacturers might use the practice in various ways to induce retailers to provide point-of-sale services and thus enhance interbrand competition. 96 On the other hand, the practice would be anticompetitive if manufacturers used it to police a cartel by 'identifying price-cutting manufacturers'.
97 Such a cartel would be per se illegal and any 'vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices' that the members adopted to 'facilitate' the cartel would be 'unlawful under the rule of reason '. 98 This passage states the uncontroversial point that any resale price maintenance scheme that cartel members adopted to enable more eff ective enforcement of the cartel's price terms would be illegal along with the horizontal price fi xing agreement itself. Indeed, it would be illegal, under Catalano, for rivals to agree to adopt resale price maintenance, even if they did not agree on prices.
But what if there were no express, horizontal agreement? Turner, writing in 1962, concluded that it was 'an unlawful agreement for oligopolists to make interdependent decisions to adopt fair trade, regardless of the means employed'.
99 Leegin, however, states only that resale price maintenance agreement might be 'useful evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of a horizontal cartel' 100 and 'should be subject to more careful scrutiny . . . if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice'.
101 This language strongly implies that industry-wide resale price maintenance alone would not constitute a plus factor. 'Additional scrutiny' would be necessary, fi rst, to determine whether the vertical agreements were anticompetitive. If the vertical agreements benefi ted consumers by inducing retailers to provide point-of-sale services, the agreements would each be lawful, and the parallel adoption of them would not permit the inference of a horizontal agreement under Matsushita, because each manufacturer would have legitimate reason for adopting the practice. If the vertical agreements were anticompetitive because they facilitated noncompetitive oligopolistic behavior without inducing retailers to provide benefi cial services, then they might be illegal under the rule of reason.
102 Even in that case, however, the industry-wide adoption of the practice alone would likely not justify an inference of a horizontal agreement, because the pattern would be consistent with lawful oligopolistic interdependence.
Of course, the widespread adoption of resale price maintenance, or any other facilitating practice, combined with other evidence might justify inference of a horizontal agreement. In Part III.C, I suggested that, while courts continue to quote the Supreme Court's vague defi nitions, they have in recent years begun to apply a more specifi c defi nition of concerted action, one that closely resembles the communication model I have To convey the requisite information, the communications must ordinarily be private and repeated, and must relate to present or future prices. These considerations apply in the case of facilitating practices as well.
In the hypothetical rural gas station, for example, coordination of prices would be more diffi cult if the stations did not post their prices on signs as well as at the pump. Thus, public price posting is literally a facilitating practice that involves price communication. But courts would certainly not fi nd that posting prices on signs amounted to a plus factor, because it also has the legitimate purpose of informing consumers of rivals' prices. Public 'signaling' and 'monitoring' of prices are too ambiguous in their eff ects to amount to plus factors, because they cannot convey the necessary intent and reliance.
103 If the information communicated is private, however, a court might infer that the communication conveyed the necessary message of intent to act in a particular way in reliance of the expectation that others would do the same. In Container, for example, the Supreme Court reasoned:
Here all that was present was a request by each defendant of its competitor for information as to the most recent price charged or quoted, whenever it needed such information and whenever it was not available from another source. Each defendant on receiving that request usually furnished the data with the expectation that it would be furnished reciprocal information when it wanted it. That concerted action is of course suffi cient to establish the combination or conspiracy, the initial ingredient of a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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The Court thus inferred the agreement to exchange current price information from the private, repeated practice of providing current pricing information when requested. The Court emphasized that this conduct was 'obviously quite diff erent from the parallel business behavior condoned in' Theatre Enterprises. 105 In this case, the inference was that the parties had agreed to exchange information, but similar evidence, in diff erent circumstances, might imply an agreement to fi x prices.
Petroleum Products, which appeared to condemn a kind of public price signaling, is not to the contrary. There, the court suggested in dicta 106 that fi rms' announcements of increases in wholesale prices and withdrawals of dealer discounts would support an inference of conspiracy, because the actions made it easier for fi rms to coordinate price increases. 107 The court pointed out, however, that because the defendants sold through franchised dealers, publishing wholesale prices would not give consumers useable information; the evidence indicated that the publication of wholesale prices was intended to inform rivals. 108 In a footnote, the court emphasized that its 'conclusion would necessarily be diff erent were the appellants' inference of a price-fi xing conspiracy based on the dissemination or advertising of retail prices; permitting an inference of conspiracy from such evidence would make it more diffi cult for retail consumers to get the information they need to make effi cient market decisions '. 109 In some circumstances, the court may infer that the requisite communications have occurred even without direct proof of the communications themselves. In Cement Institute, for example, the Court affi rmed the FTC's inference of an agreement to engage in basing-point pricing.
110 Like an agreement to adhere to announced prices, an agreement among rivals to calculate freight from basing points greatly reduces the complexity of coordinating prices. Because basing-point pricing might provide benefi ts, however, parallel adoption of the practice would not alone justify the inference of an agreement to adopt it. In Cement Institute, however, the FTC inferred an agreement from evidence that the defendants not only quoted delivered prices from standard basing points, but also coordinated eff orts to punish deviators from the practice.
111 These methods included the imposition of punitive basing points at the locations of cement dealers that did not follow the system. These and other practices made it reasonable for the FTC to infer the agreement, even in the absence of testimony about specifi c communications.
IV. Conclusion
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